You may be correct, because if he states in his book that, "Most panpsychists will deny that your socks are conscious, while asserting that they are ultimately composed of things that are conscious," and if that is, indeed, his position, it sounds as if he maintained that matter had an additional property of consciousness. That is however, basically, what e.g. classical dualistic theism postulates (“immanent godliness”).

However, he also says that his ideas are derived from Russellian monism, and here it is essential to distinguish between relative, emergent properties and intrinsic ones. And AFAICT, Goff says that the only such true property of matter is consciousness. That de facto means that matter is in its nature consciousness, only said in a roundabout way. (That Goff also identifies as panpsychist, which brings its own set of problems, does not help much in this case. )

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russellian-monism/

But – I would definitely not label him as a proponent of dualism and he's clearly no materialist monist either. What does that make him and how is such position substantially different from Kastrup's?